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Pestana: On Teaching Moral Philosophy

On Teaching Moral Philosophy
by MARK PESTANA
T'S HARD

to avoid feeling like a sophist when teaching moral philosophy. Not

the ethics professor present arguments for moral positions which
Ihe oronlyshemust
abhors, but those arguments must be made as plausible as possible. And,

as if that is not enough, the teacher's knowledge of personal moral inadequacies
can make the enterprise appear as the most preposterous pretension. This selfsuspicion of sophistry on the part of the moral philosophy teacher is not mere
psychic hypochondria. The causes of this suspicion are real sources of danger in
the pedagogy of morality.
I want to spell out what these dangers are, how they arise, and indi,cate how
Bob Reuman managed to avoid them. To provide a framework for this story I'll
first discuss how moral philosophy is currently being taught in the United States
and the standard justifications for teaching ethics. Then I'll indicate the source
of potential sophistry in this context and its effects on teaching. I'll close on a
more positive note with a discussion of Bob's powerfully effective teaching.
There are two general approaches to the academic study of morality: the
theore~ical and the applied. Moral theory can be further divided into four more
or less distinct disciplines. Teaching moral philosophy usually conflates all of
these divisions, but departments at larger universities do offer courses within
each specific branch.
The first type of theoretical study, which is primarily the concern of anthropology and comparative religion, has been referred to as "descriptive ethics."
This type of inquiry involves study of the content of the moralities of different
peoples, religions, and political movements. A more distinctively philosophical
approach to the theoretical study of morals is "analytic" ethics, which involves
the analysis of concepts common to all moralities. This field addresses questions
such as: what is the nature of moral obligation, how does morality relate to law,
what constitutes a moral right, what is morality, etc. These two approaches to
morality are regarded by some as nonnormative. This is rather controversial
since a nonnormative and purely descriptive study of Nazi ethics, for instance,
would seem to be both impossible and undesirable and since results in the
conceptual study of moralities have normative implications, e.g., in the study of
the relation between morality and the law. In any event, the third division of
theoretical inquiry is distinctively normative. "Metaethics" may be regarded as
the attempt to evaluate the various moralities which have been delineated by the
descriptive branch. This attempt is perhaps the most controversial branch of the
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philosophical study ofmorality because it amounts to an attempt to stand outside
of any specific morality and assess its value. Some philosophers have dismissed
this attempt as an intellectual pretense since, so it is argued, it is impossible to
step outside of all moralities. Therefore any so-called metaethical evaluation of
a specific morality will only be a disguised evaluation from within some other
specific morality.
The fourth branch of theoretical inquiry returns to the level of specific
moralities and involves the formulation and grounding of a system of morals.
The classic examples of this philosophical endeavor are Thomas Aquinas'
Natural Law morality, Kant's Morality of Freedom, and Bentham's Utilitarianism. The tenuousness of the division of inquiry is evident here since grounding
nloral precepts involves metaethical justification and since a conception of the
nature and purpose of morality is crucial to the formulation.
The other general category of the philosophical study of morals involves the
application of moral principles to specific problems of conduct. This field was
once referred to as "casuistry," but is now called "applied ethics." The literature
in this field is burgeoning. There are now specialized studies, and courses
offered, in business ethics, environmental ethics, medical ethics, nursing ethics,
agricultural ethics, police ethics, computer ethics, military ethics, etc. This
attention to applications is a relatively recent phenomenon. Before 1970 (roughly)
the concern of moral philosophers was primarily with the theoretical analysis of
morality. Since the time of the war in Vietnam that concern has shifted to the
applied.
Several developments, coincident with the war, prompted this change, e.g.,
moral dilemmas created by developments in nledicine, the publicity of scandals in
the practice ofbusiness,environmental difficulties (and the Vietnam War itself), all
serving to bring philosophers out into the streets. Quite recently cuts in education
funding have forced philosophers to justify their contribution to education. This
struggle for justification shifts the emphasis in teaching (especially at junior
colleges and state universities which focus on vocational training) to the "relevant"
aspects of philosophy. Hence the increased attention to applied ethics.
Another form of this vindication is to justify the study of morality, both
theoretical and applied, on the grounds of its effect on the consciousness of
students. Philosophers claim that the study of morality, both theoretical and
applied, expands the awareness of students. Even the most frivolous student of
moral philosophy would necessarily become more aware of his or her own moral
beliefs and practices. The student's morality is turned into a reflective morality
instead of remaining the unreflected-upon mores of some larger social group.
This awareness is brought about by forced understanding of divergent moralities
and, at least in some classrooms, by the forced application of the student's own
morals to particularly problematic situations (hypothetical or historical). Along
with this heightened awareness must come an increased awareness of the
morality of the other. This is brought about in the forced exposure to moralities
which diverge from that of the student and, in some classrooms, by forcing the
students to apply the divergent moralities to a problem situation.
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There are several possible interesting consequences of this increased awareness. One student may discover that she really has no morals at all (assuming this
is a theoretical possibility). For example, she may realize that she does not
endorse any of the values of any system of ethics. Another student may find out
that, whatever he does, he does merely to avoid punishment by authority figures.
Yet another may discover that her morals are utterly contradictory, e.g., that she
endorses divine command hedonism. Someone else may find out that his morals
contain nonmoral relics from childhood, e.g., that being neatly groomed has the
same moral status as telling the truth. A fifth student may discover that her "real"
morals are evil. For example, though she insists to herself that she is a devout
Christian, she comes to realize that her most important value is personal success
regardless of the cost to others. Finally, the student can come to an awareness of
the "unsavory" implications ofcertain moral beliefs. This is occasionally evident
in those students who endorse some sort of divine command conception of
morality, i.e., moral principles are equivalent to the commands of God. One
implication of this conception that some find unacceptable is that if moral rules
are the commands of God then it simply makes no sense to claim that God
commands us to act a certain way because so acting is good.
Now it should be evident that this attempted vindication of teaching ethics (in
terms ofexpanded awareness) assumes that ifconsequences such as these obtain,
then further changes will be prompted in the student: for instance, that she will
adopt a morality or rectify the incoherence of her morals or that he will change
his morals because they are evil or have unacceptable implications. There is a
definite connection between knowledge and action in teaching moral philosophy.
In the fight for their life within the academy, moral philosophy teachers offer
another vindication of the profession which pertains even more closely to action
on the part of the student. The reason for studying applied ethics is (so it is
claimed) that the student's ability to reason about moral issues will be improved.
Presumably, this refinement of casuistical abilities follows from the increased
awareness of one's own moral beliefs and from practice at applying principles
to cases.
The issue of sophistry enters precisely at this point. Both justifications for the
study of moral philosophy ultimately rest on the assumption that students of
moral philosophy will become morally better persons (as both Kant and Aristotle
argued they should). If this does not occur, then teaching nloral philosophy
degenerates into sheer sophistry. As a cynic recently argued, teaching ofbusiness
ethics merely serves to furnish the practitioners of morally suspect business
activities with sophisticated means of justifying what they will do, even in the
absence of such rationalizations. (I suppose the most preposterous example of
this sort of thing was Eichmann's appeal to Kantian ethics to justify his
obedience to orders.) So, to avoid sophistical pedagogy, the teaching of moral
philosophy must succeed in bringing about the moral improvement of its
students.
This improvement involves bringing about two quite distinct changes; the
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student must be brought to awareness, and that awareness must be translated into
changed practice. Which task is emphasized depends ultimately on one's
metaphysical conception of the relation between knowledge of the good (what
is right and wrong) and action. On one side is the Platonic-Socratic conception
whereby no one knowingly does wrong, i.e., knowledge of the good is sufficient
for right action. On the other side is the Christian conception that knowledge of
the good (Le., God's will) is only necessary for right action and choice is needed
(Le., it is possible knowingly to do wrong). Unfortunately, the danger of
sophistry is present in moral instruction regardless of the metaphysical stance.
For those students who never apprehend the good, moral philosophy will only
serve to provide them with sophistical rationalization for the pursuit of illusory
goods and, for those who choose wrongly in spite of their apprehension of the
good, moral philosophy will enhance their capacity to rationalize their wrongdoing.
So, in order to avoid sophistry, the instructor must do everything possible to
enhance the student's awareness and to put that enhanced awareness into action.
The first task is probably the easier. All the standard classroom work in ethics
instruction contributes to that effort. The second task, however, is especially
liable to failure due to student estrangement from the instructor and thereby fronl
philosophy as such. This estrangement can arise from two causes which are
peculiar to the nloral philosophy classroom.
The first occasion for student alienation arises if the student is in fundamental
disagreement with the morals ofthe professor. For example, the student may find
out that the teacher signed a petition against abortion, which was published in a
local newspaper. If this disagreement goes deep enough, Le., if the issue is one
about which the student really cares, then the effect on pedagogy can be
devastating. The student may simply reject the philosophical approach to
morality as merely a way of "making the weaker argument appear stronger."
Pedagogy which is tolerant of difference and respectful of divergent judgment
may go some distance in minimizing such rejection. In the best case the student
would leave the course better able to articulate and defend his/her own position
and would have a better understanding of arguments for the opposing view. This
in itself is cause for hope since being more aware does increase the possibility
that if one's conscience is in error then it is culpably in error. All are agreed that
improved understanding is a necessary condition for moral improvement.
However, added to this is a second source of student alienation which does not
depend on the content of the instructor's morals.
In this second case the alienation is occasioned if the student suspects that
there is a radical discontinuity between the moral beliefs of the teacher and the
actual actions of the teacher. In other words, the student regards the teacher as
a hypocrite. In this instance moral philosophizing is dismissed as fraudulent
because it appears that what one thinks is utterly irrelevant to what one does. If
the ethics teacher blatantly lacks the very virtues he extols, then not only will
cynicism about moral philosophy arise but warranted cynicism about morality
in general may follow. If the teacher of ethics really is a sophist, then what is
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taught should be dismissed. Because morality is essentially connected to action,
teaching morality and leading an immoral life presents the student with an utterly
incongruous role n10del, which, as every educator knows, is devastating to
pedagogy.
Resisting these two corruptive influences places a tremendous burden on
anyone with pretensions of teaching morality. In order to teach well, one must
effect a change in the moral character of one's students and, in order to ensure
that, it really is necessary to practice just what you preach.
Now it is obvious to all of us who studied morals with Bob Reuman that he
is the n10ral philosopher and ethics teacher par excellence. He was extraordinarily patient with and tolerant of students whose morals diverged radically from his
own. From the student's perspective this was especially admirable since, as
would become evident during the course of instruction, Bob's own moral
commitments were so strong. His consistent and persistent practice of respectful
pedagogy in the ethics classroom virtually eliminated student estrangement due
to differences in fundamental moral commitments.
Against estrangement arising from incongruities in the life of the ethics
teacher, Bob's life provided the best possible defense. I have not met anyone else
in the An1erican Philosophical Association to compare with Bob in respect to the
continuity between theory and practice. All of the teachers of ethics I know have
little experience beyond the confines of their own North American suburban
middle-class culture. And though most of them really are deeply concerned
about morality, that concern is not translated into actions other than taking stands
on curricular matters or signing petitions. This seems so far removed from the
lives of the great exemplars of moral virtue (those who can't, teach!). The
problem with having a moral mediocrity for an ethics instructor centers on the
content of the academic discipline. Moral philosophy is not like other subjects
taught in the academy since it ultimately concerns how to live the best life. In a
sense, the life being led by the person who is teaching the subject is itself part of
the curriculum. And because of his own morally exen1plary life, Bob not only
completely eliminated the corruptive influence of the incongruous role model,
he provided a positive inspiration to his students. It is possible to live the best life.
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